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Abstract
As demonstrated by the email game of Rubinstein (1989), the predictions of the
standard equilibrium models of game theory are sensitive to assumptions about the
ﬁne details of the higher order beliefs. This paper shows that models of bounded depth
of reasoning based on level-k thinking or cognitive hierarchy make predictions that
are independent of the tail assumptions on the higher order beliefs. The framework
developed here provides a language that makes it possible to identify general conditions
on depth of reasoning, instead of committing to a particular model such as level-k
thinking or cognitive hierarchy.
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1 Introduction
One of the assumptions maintained in the standard equilibrium analysis of game
theory is that agents have unlimited reasoning ability—they are able to perform
arbitrarily complicated iterative deductions in order to predict their opponent’s
behavior. For instance, the assumption of common knowledge of rationality en-
tails everyone being rational, everyone knowing that their opponent is rational,
everyone knowing that their opponent knows that they are rational, and so on ad
inﬁnitum. Such higher order beliefs assumptions may be useful approximations in
certain common and simple strategic situations, but one would not expect them to
hold uniformly in all interactions. Even simple games that we encounter in every-
day economic interactions are complicated enough to suggest that people may not
have enough cognitive ability to solve them inductively.
This observation that people do not, in reality, take the inductive reasoning to
its logical conclusion has been widely recognized, one of the quintessential illus-
trations being the email game of Rubinstein (1989).1 In this game, two generals are
facing a common enemy. There are two possible informational scenarios. In the
ﬁrst one, it is common knowledge that the enemy is weak and the generals would
like to coordinate an attack on him. In the second scenario, the enemy can be either
strong or weak, and the generals want to attack only in the latter case. Only one
general knows for sure if the enemy is weak and this knowledge is later shared
between the two generals through a back and forth email exchange. At some ﬁ-
nite point in time, an email gets lost and this leaves the generals in a situation of
“almost common knowledge,” but not “common knowledge”, i.e., they both know
that the enemy is weak, they both know that they both know this, and so on, but
only ﬁnitely many times; see Section 2 for a formal description of the game.
Intuitively, the difference between the two scenarios should be small, especially
if the number of emails is large. However, as Rubinstein shows, this difference
is critical. In the second scenario, no matter how many email messages get ex-
changed, the generals will not be able to coordinate successfully: the only equilib-
1This game is related to the coordinated attack problem in computer science, see, e.g., Halpern
(1986)
2
rium involves not attacking the enemy despite the fact that a successfully coordi-
nated attack is an equilibrium in the game with common knowledge. Rubinstein
ﬁnds it hard to believe that the generals will try to outguess each other and fail
to coordinate even in cases when the number of messages they exchange is very
large and intuitively close to the simple game of the ﬁrst scenario. He ﬁnds this
discontinuity of behavior with respect to higher order beliefs counterintuitive and
writes:
The sharp contrast between our intuition and the game-theoretic analy-
sis is what makes this example paradoxical. This game joins a long list
of games such as the ﬁnitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, the chain
store paradox and Rosenthal’s game, in which it seems that the source
of discrepancy is rooted in the fact that in our formal analysis we use
mathematical induction while human beings do not use mathematical
induction when reasoning. Systematic explanation of our intuition [...]
is deﬁnitely a most intriguing question.
This paper provides precisely such a systematic explanation. The model studied
here uses the recent non-equilibrium approach to strategic thinking.2 The premise
of this approach is that each agent has bounded depth of reasoning, and that the
actual bound depends on his “cognitive type.” An agent with bound k can perform
at most k “steps of reasoning,” i.e., can iterate the best response correspondence at
most k times. These “level-k” or “cognitive hierarchy” models have been successful
at accounting for many of the systematic deviations from equilibrium behavior,
such as coordination in market entry games, overbidding in auctions, deviations
from the unique mixed strategy equilibrium, and other phenomena; however, there
are also environments in which the predictive power of such models is low: Ivanov,
Levin, and Niederle (2010) and Georganas, Healy, and Weber (2010). This paper
provides a general framework within which such games can be analyzed.
The main result of this paper, Theorem 3, is that in the email game there exists a
2See Nagel (1995); Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995); Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998); Costa-Gomes,
Crawford, and Broseta (2001); Camerer (2003); Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004); Costa-Gomes and
Crawford (2006); Crawford and Iriberri (2007a,b); Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008);
Crawford, Kugler, Neeman, and Pauzner (2009); Healy, Georganas, and Weber (2010).
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ﬁnite number of messages such that coordination is possible among all “cognitive
types,” no matter how high their bound, provided that they receive at least that
many messages. This result is not a simple consequence of the fact that players are
bounded, but rather is an outcome of the strategic interaction between the players
and in particular their beliefs about the boundedness of their opponents. The in-
tuition for the result is that if a high level type believes mostly in lower levels who
themselves believe in even lower levels, and so on, then the behavior of all types
is largely determined by the actions of the least cognitively able type, making the
coordination possible. In the extreme case, if everyone believes only in the lowest
type, then coordination is immediate. The result holds under a fairly general as-
sumption on those beliefs, and an extension shows that even if sophisticated types
without a cognitive bound are allowed, the above conclusion still holds provided
the fraction of such inﬁnite types is not too large.
While capturing Rubinstein’s intuition, this simple and rigorous argument makes
predictions that are consistent with observed behavior. In an experimental study,
Camerer (2003) shows that in a variant of the email game the subjects were able to
successfully coordinate after receiving a certain ﬁnite number of messages, thereby
behaving according to the strategy described in the above paragraph. Interestingly,
after several repetitions of the game the number of messages required for a coor-
dinated attack increased, eventually rendering the coordination impossible.3 This
behavior suggests that models of bounded depth of reasoning may be useful for
capturing the initial behavior in games, whereas in more frequent interactions a
larger role may be played by the standard equilibrium models of game theory and
the higher order beliefs considerations.
The formal result of this paper sheds light on a large literature in game theory
that has developed in response to Rubinstein’s (1989) paper. The goal of one of the
branches of this literature is to restore the continuity of the equilibrium behavior by
redeﬁning the notion of distance on higher order beliefs. According to this new no-
tion of distance, receiving even a very large number of messages does not bring the
3There is evidence that in similar coordination games (Cabrales, Nagel, and Armenter, 2007;
Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels, 2004) experimental subjects behave differently; since this paper
focuses on theoretical aspects, these differences will not be discussed here.
4
agents close to common knowledge and for this reason the difference in behavior
between the two scenarios is no longer paradoxical. By contrast, this paper remains
faithful to the intuitive notion of distance and changes the solution concept to the
one that preserves continuity.4
Another branch of literature that ensued from Rubinstein’s (1989) paper stud-
ies global games: games where the multiplicity of equilibria is eliminated by a
“contagion” argument, very much like the one used in the email game.5 In a com-
mon knowledge game with multiple equilibria, a particular equilibrium is selected
based on the proximity of this game to a game of “almost common knowledge”
where the equilibrium is unique. The tools developed in this paper may be use-
ful for analyzing the extent to which such selection arguments rely on unbounded
depth of reasoning; for a related paper see Kneeland (2012).
In the course of developing the argument of this paper, a general model of
bounded depth of reasoning is constructed. This model nests the models exist-
ing in the literature as special cases identiﬁed with the speciﬁc assumptions they
make about the relationship between the bound on an agent’s reasoning and his
belief about other agents’ boundedness. The “universal” model of this paper pro-
vides the requisite formal language that makes it possible to vary independently
the assumptions about these two components (bound and belief), making it eas-
ier to understand the dependence of the results on particular assumptions. The
notion of cognitive type space developed here allows for studying richer forms of
dependency between the bound and the belief, which offers a new direction for the
analysis of models of bounded depth of reasoning and its applications to various
economic settings.
4Formally, cognitive rationalizability is upper hemi-continuous in the product topology on
higher order beliefs.
5Like the email game, global games are dominant-solvable, they take inﬁnitely many rounds to
solve, and the standard solution differs starkly between the complete and incomplete information
versions of the game, see, e.g., Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998) and Frankel,
Morris, and Pauzner (2003), among others.
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2 Email Game
Two generals at different locations face a common enemy whose strength is un-
known. They have to independently decide whether to Attack (A) or Not Attack
(N). There are two possibilities: the enemy is either strong (s) or weak (w); both
players put a common prior probability 1
2
on s and 1
2
on w. Initially the informa-
tion about the state of nature is known only to player 1. However, the following
information communication protocol is at work: if player 1 learns that the enemy
is weak (and only in this case) an email is sent from his computer to player 2’s com-
puter. Player 2’s computer is programmed to send a conﬁrmation message back to
player 1. Player 1’s computer automatically sends a conﬁrmation to player 2 and
so on. There is a probability " > 0 that each message can get lost, in which case the
communication stops; with probability 1 the process will stop after a ﬁnite number
of messages. Players can not inﬂuence this protocol and they have to make their
decisions only after the communication stops. The state space is equal to:
 = f(0; 0); (1; 0); (1; 1); (2; 1); (2; 2); : : :g
where in state (0; 0) the enemy is strong and in all other states he is weak. In each
state (i; j) the number of messages sent by player 1 is equal to i and the number
of messages sent by player 2 is j. Each player knows only his number; they never
know if the reason for no reply is that their message got lost or the reply to their
message got lost. The partitions and posteriors of players are shown below in Ta-
ble 1.
player 1 1 1
2 "
1 "
2 "
1
2 "
1 "
2 " ...
...
 (0; 0) (1; 0) (1; 1) (2; 1) (2; 2) ...
:::
player 2 1
1+"
"
1+"
1
2 "
1 "
2 " :::
Table 1: Partitions and posteriors in the email game.
Players’ payoffs depend on the strength of the enemy: if the enemy is strong
Not Attacking is a dominant action, if he is weak the game is one of coordination;
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see Table 2.6
Attack Not Attack
Attack  2; 2  2; 0
Not Attack 0; 2 0; 0
(a) Enemy is strong
Attack Not Attack
Attack 1; 1  2; 0
Not Attack 0; 2 0; 0
(b) Enemy is weak
Table 2: Payoffs in the email game.
If it was common knowledge that the enemy is weak, i.e., that the payoff matrix
is the one on the right, then it would be possible for the two generals to coordinate
and decide to Attack. However, with the information structure described above, w
is never common knowledge. For example, if the state of nature is (2; 1), then both
players know w, 1 knows that 2 knows w, 2 knows that 1 knows w, but 2 doesn’t
know that 1 knows that 2 knowsw. Nevertheless, if the number of messages sent by
both players is high, then they have almost common knowledge of w in the sense that
they knoww, they know that they knoww and so on, many many times. According
to Rubinstein’s intuition, both situations are almost the same in the minds of the
players, so their behavior should not be different. Unfortunately, the following
puzzling result obtains.
Theorem 1 (Rubinstein). The unique rationalizable strategy proﬁle of the email game is
that both players choose Not Attack, regardless of how many messages they got.
6The same payoff matrix is used in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006); the numerical values of
payoffs do not play any role and can be replaced by any other numbers as in Rubinstein (1989). The
game is slightly different from Rubinstein’s (1989) original formulation in that when the enemy is
strong Attacking is strictly dominated, whereas in Rubinstein’s original game Attacking is a (Pareto-
dominated) Nash equilibrium. This modiﬁcation makes the analysis of the game simpler by making
coordination even more difﬁcult: it eliminates the motive for Player 1 to Attack when the enemy is
strong, thus making the results of this paper even stronger.
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3 Limited depth of reasoning
The literature on limited depth of reasoning postulates that each player has a bound k
on reasoning, where k 2 f0; 1; : : :g. A player with bound k = 0 is a nonrational and
nonstrategic type which is allowed to take any action; its behavior is used by other
players to anchor their beliefs. All other players are rational, i.e., best respond to
some belief about their opponents. A player with k = 1 best responds to the belief
that his opponents are of type k = 0. Beliefs of players with k > 1 are deﬁned
according to some pre-speciﬁed rule: Some authors (e.g., Costa-Gomes and Craw-
ford, 2006) assume that a player with bound k believes that his opponents’ bound
is k   1, while other authors (e.g., Camerer et al., 2004) assume that a player with
bound k has a nondegenerate belief on the set f0; 1; : : : ; k   1g.
The approach of this paper is to use a general notion of a cognitive type space,
which can accommodate any assumption about the beliefs of player k about his
opponent. Furthermore, for the purposes of this paper it will be useful to uncouple
the two pieces of the description above: the cognitive type space, i.e., the description
of depth of reasoning and beliefs, and the solution concept, i.e., the description of the
actions taken by each cognitive type (act irrationally, or best respond to a belief).
3.1 Notation
For any measurable space X with a -algebra  the set of all -additive probability
measures on X is denoted (X). We consider (X) as a measurable space with
the -algebra that is generated by all sets of the form f 2 (X) j (E)  pg for
E 2  and p 2 [0; 1]. For x 2 X the Dirac measure on x is denoted x.
3.2 Cognitive type spaces
The main notion introduced in this section generalizes various models studied in
the literature while remaining faithful to one of their main assumptions, which is
that agents are concerned only about opponents with bounds lower than them-
selves. There seem to be two main justiﬁcations for this assumption in the litera-
ture. The ﬁrst one is to escape the ﬁxed point logic of equilibrium, where a player
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best responds to an opponent that best responds to that player. The second reason
is that an agent with a low bound on reasoning simply cannot predict what an op-
ponent with a high bound will do because that would require him use more steps
of reasoning that are available to him. He is thus forced to model an opponent with
a high bound as one with a lower bound that he is able to wrap his mind around.
The construction generalizes the existing models in the direction of allowing an
agent with a given bound to have arbitrary beliefs about his opponents’ bound (as
long as it is below his own). This freedom offers a systematic way of nesting dif-
ferent modeling assumptions about beliefs inside one uniﬁed model and thereby
examining which results are a simple consequence of the fact that the agents are
bounded and which ones are more subtle and rely on the speciﬁc assumptions
about the perception of the boundedness.
Similarly to the literature on the foundations of games of incomplete informa-
tion there are two alternate approaches to the description of the beliefs of a player
about the bounds of his opponents: hierarchies of beliefs and type spaces.7
The hierarchies of beliefs approach is an extensive description of the beliefs of
an agent about the bound of his opponents, together with his beliefs about their
beliefs about the bound of their opponents, and so on. Appendix A studies this
approach in detail and its connection to the approach of cognitive type spaces.
The main focus of the paper is on the application of Harsanyi’s idea of a type
space in the context of depth of reasoning. A cognitive type of a player is a compact
description of his hierarchy: it is composed of his own bound together with his
belief about the cognitive types of his opponent. A cognitive type space is a collection
of cognitive types of each player.
Deﬁnition 1 (Cognitive type space). A cognitive type spaceC is a tuple (Ci; ki; i)i=1;:::;I
such that Ci is a measurable space and the measurable mappings ki : Ci ! N and
i : Ci ! (C i) are such that
i(ci) (fc i 2 C i j k i(c i) < ki(ci)g) = 1 for all ci with ki(ci) > 0. (1)
7See, e.g., Harsanyi (1967); Mertens and Zamir (1985); Brandenburger and Dekel (1993); Heifetz
and Samet (1998).
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In this notation ci 2 Ci denotes the cognitive type of player i, the number ki(ci)
is the cognitive ability of this type, i.e., his bound, and the distribution i(ci) is the
belief that this type has about the cognitive types of his opponents. Equation (1)
ensures that all players believe that their opponents’ ability is below their own (the
notation k i(c i) < ki(ci) means that kj(cj) < ki(ci) for all j 6= i).8 9
This simple construction can capture many different assumptions about beliefs.
For example, the collection of all possible cognitive hierarchies is a cognitive type
space, which does not involve any assumptions about the beliefs.
Example 1 (Universal cognitive type space). The universal cognitive type space
(Ci ; k

i ; 

i )i=1;:::;N constructed in Appendix A is a cognitive type space, which cap-
tures all possible hierarchies of beliefs.
A feature of Example 1 is that there are multiple cognitive types with the same
bound k that are distinguished by the beliefs they hold about the bound of their
opponents. The cognitive type spaces used in the literature typically involve an
assumption that rules this out: the level k of a type uniquely determines his beliefs.
Property 1 (Level determines beliefs). For all i and all ci the function i(ci) depends
on ci only through ki(ci).
In such type spaces all agents of the same level have the same beliefs. This can
be modeled as there being only one cognitive type of each level.10 Any such type
space is isomorphic to one with Ci := N and ki(k) := k for all k 2 N. The following
two examples illustrate the most frequently used spaces.
Example 2 (Immediate-predecessor type space). In this type space, all cognitive
types believe with probability one that the opponent is their immediate predecessor
in the cognitive hierarchy, i.e., IPi (k) = k 1, a Dirac measure concentrated on k 1.
8The beliefs of the nonstrategic type 0 player don’t matter because he is “just acting”.
9Formally, the cognitive state space is a Harsanyi type space, where besides beliefs each player
has an additional source of information: his cognitive level. The cognitive type space encodes all
hierarchies of beliefs with the assumption of common belief that “your level is smaller than mine.”
10As explained before, the cognitive type space is a description of the cognitive abilities of the
agent, while the solution concept is a description of his actions. Thus, there being only one type of
each level does not impose any restrictions on the number of possible actions taken. The multiplicity
of actions for each cognitive type is modeled as part of a solution concept, described in Section 3.3.
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In other words, a level 1 player believes that his opponent is of level 0, a level 2
player believes that his opponent is of level 1, etc. This type space was used for
example by Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) and others and together with the
solution concept, to be discussed in Section 3.3, it constitutes the well known “level-
k model”.
This type space has a property that, although as k grows types become smarter,
their beliefs become farther away from any ﬁxed distribution on the population of
players. By contrast, in the following example a level k agent believes not only in
level k  1 but also in lower levels, which results in the convergence of their beliefs
as k grows.
Example 3 (Common-conditionals type space). In this type space, beliefs are con-
structed as conditionals of a ﬁxed, full support distribution 2 (N). Thus, CP()i (k)(n) =
(n)Pk 1
l=0 (l)
for n < k and zero otherwise. In other words, a level 1 player believes that
his opponent is of level 0, but a level 2 player believes that his opponent is of level 1
or level 0 and so on for higher levels. The role of  resembles the role of the common
conditionals in the Harsanyi type spaces. Such type spaces were used for example
by Camerer et al. (2004), where  was taken to be a Poisson distribution and to-
gether with the solution concept, to be discussed in Section 3.3, it constitutes the
well known “cognitive hierarchy model”.11 In empirical estimation of this model, 
is taken to be the “objective distribution of types.” Such an objective distribution is
also necessary for estimation of the level-k model; however, there is no counterpart
of it in the model itself.
Example 3 has the property that for any two cognitive levels k and n they share
conditional beliefs on types lower than minfk; ng. The following weaker condi-
tion does not restrict conditional beliefs, but requires that, as k grows to inﬁnity,
the beliefs converge to some distribution over levels (which doesn’t have to be the
common prior).
11See also Stahl (1993) and Stahl and Wilson (1995).
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Property 2 (Convergent beliefs).
lim
k!1
i (k) exists.12
Property 2 is satisﬁed in Example 3 but violated by Example 2. The following
even weaker condition, which is key to the results to follow, limits the extent to
which the beliefs can diverge. It says that as k grows, agents put less and less
weight on the types immediately below them: for any increasing sequence of levels
there is a level in the sequence, such that all cognitive types of that level put at most
probability  on the opponent being above the previous level in the sequence.
Property 3 (Nondiverging beliefs). There exists a constant  2 [0; 1) such that for
any strictly increasing sequence fkng1n=0 of natural numbers
inf
n
sup
ci2fci2Cijki(ci)=kng
i (ci)
 fc i 2 C i j k i(c i)  kn 1g < :
In the presence of Property 1, this condition boils down to the following simple
one. There exists a constant  2 [0; 1) such that for any strictly increasing sequence
fkng1n=0 of natural numbers
inf
n
i (k
n)
 fk i  kn 1g < :
It is immediate that the beliefs in the immediate-predecessor type space of Exam-
ple 2 violate Property 3, while the beliefs in the common conditionals type space
of Example 3 satisfy it with  = 0. In general any beliefs that converge, i.e., satisfy
Property 2, satisfy this property with  = 0. As the following example shows, also
beliefs that do not converge can satisfy Property 3.
Example 4 (A mixture of immediate-predecessor and common-conditionals type
spaces). Let  2 (0; 1) and  2 (N) be a ﬁxed, full support distribution. Deﬁne
12Formally, i (k) 2 f0; : : : ; k   1g, so the limit is taken after imbedding all those measures in
(N). The topology on (N) is the weak topology.
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i(k) = 
IP
i (k) + (1  )CP()i (k). It is easy to verify that
lim
n
i (k
n)
 fk i  kn 1g = ;
that is, such beliefs satisfy Property 3 with  2 (; 1).
3.3 Solution concepts
This section deﬁnes the solution concept, which is a consistency condition on the
actions taken by all cognitive types. A game is a tuple G = (ui; Ai)i=1;:::;I , where
for each i, Ai is a set of actions and ui : A1      AI ! R is a payoff function.13
Given a game G and a cognitive type space C a strategy i : Ci ! Ai tells the agent
what to do for each possible cognitive type that he might have. A strategy proﬁle
(i)i=1;:::;I is a cognitive equilibrium14 if and only if for all i = 1; : : : ; I , for all ci 2 Ci
with ki(ci) > 0, and all ai 2 AiZ
ui (i(ci);  i(c i)) di(ci)(c i) 
Z
ui (ai;  i(c i)) di(ci)(c i):
Formally, the notion of cognitive equilibrium can be seen as Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium on the cognitive space and letting every type with ki(ci) = 0 have a constant
utility. Intuitively, cognitive equilibrium deﬁnes how beliefs about levels interact
with beliefs about actions. It allows type k = 0 to take any action. Type k = 1
best responds to the action that type k = 0 is taking. Type k = 2 best responds to
those two actions and his beliefs about the proportion of the types k = 0 and k = 1
of his opponent. Actions of higher types are determined similarly. A cognitive
13This formulation captures both normal-form games, as well as Bayesian games in their “type-
agent representation,” see, e.g., Myerson (1991). Note that this approach makes beliefs about the
state of nature implicit in the payoffs (they are integrated out); thus, versions of a level-1 player who
have different beliefs about their payoffs are modeled as distinct players with different (determin-
istic) payoff functions. For a model with explicit beliefs about the state (but implicit beliefs about
cognitive ability), see Kets (2014) and Heifets and Kets (2013).
14“Cognitive equilibrium” is perhaps not the most fortunate term, but it retains the main idea
of equilibrium, which is that players have correct beliefs about their opponents’ strategies (while
having possibly incorrect beliefs about their types or cognitive types). In particular, in case of a tie
they have a correct belief about which of the actions will be taken by an opponent; the set-valued
concept discussed below relaxes this assumption.
13
equilibrium can be thus computed in a simple iterative manner, given the action of
type k = 0. The literature makes different assumptions about this action, sometime
it is a uniform randomization over all the actions, sometime it is an action that is
focal in the given game. The above solution concept can accommodate any such
assumption.
Another possible solution concept is set-valued, analogously to rationalizabil-
ity. Such cognitive rationalizability assigns to type k = 0 the set of all feasible actions,
and then the iterative procedure described above determines the set of actions of
each cognitive type. If C is the immediate predecessor type space, then this boils
down precisely to iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies, where the set
of actions of each k shrinks as k increases, eventually converging to the set of ratio-
nalizable strategies. Under other assumptions on C, for example if it satisﬁes the
nondiverging beliefs assumption, this convergence is slowed down and the limit
set of actions is strictly larger than rationalizability.15;16
Finally, it is sometimes assumed that there are multiple instances of every type,
each believing in a different action taken by the opponent. For example, Crawford
and Iriberri (2007b) have two possible actions for k = 0 (uniform randomization
and truthful reporting) and two possible actions for k = 1 (best response to ran-
domization, best response to truthful reporting), and so on. Such multiplicity can
be easily modeled as a reﬁnement of the above cognitive rationalizability solution
where the starting value for k = 0 is not the set of all actions, but some nonsingle-
ton selection of them. The advantage of the conceptual separation of the cognitive
type space and the solution concept that this paper adopts is that the assumptions
about the belief structure can be discussed independently of the actions taken by
the player of level k = 0.
15See Stahl (1993) who uses a similar solution concept with a common-conditionals type space.
16Another possible solution concept, considered by Ho et al. (1998) and Rogers, Palfrey, and
Camerer (2009) is where each agent’s action is a noisy best response to his beliefs.
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4 The Analysis of the Email Game
This section discusses the predictions of the models of bounded depth of reason-
ing in the email game and compares various assumptions on beliefs, i.e., various
cognitive type spaces.
The construction starts out by describing the behavior of the cognitive type k =
0. For both players, this strategy is simply to attack regardless of the number of
messages received, see Table 3.17
player 1, k = 0 A A A ...
(0; 0) (1; 0) (1; 1) (2; 1) (2; 2) ...
player 2, k = 0 A A ...
Table 3: Level 0 actions in the email game.
Now, derive the behavior of types with k = 1. Player 1 in the information
set f(0; 0)g will play N because it is a dominant action when the enemy is strong.
In other information sets, his action will remain A because it is the best response
to player 2 attacking and the enemy being weak. Similarly, for sufﬁciently small
values of ", Player 2 will choose N in the information set f(0; 0); (1; 0)g and keep
playing A in the remaining information sets; see Table 4.
player 1, k = 1 N A A ...
player 1, k = 0 A A A ...
(0; 0) (1; 0) (1; 1) (2; 1) (2; 2) ...
player 2, k = 0 A A ...
player 2, k = 1 N A ...
Table 4: Level 0 and 1 actions in the email game.
17This assumption is made here for simplicity of exposition. Alternative, perhaps more realistic,
assumptions are discussed in Section 4.3.1.
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A key point in the analysis involves a situation where player i of cognitive level
k faces player j whose levels l = 0; 1; : : : ; k 2 chose A in both of the information
sets considered by i to be possible, but type l = k 1 chooses N in one of these sets
and A in the other. In such a situation player i will be referred to as being “on the
fence.”
The ﬁrst example of the situation of being “on the fence” is the strategic choice
of player 1 with k = 2. In the information set f(0; 0)g it is still dominant for him
to choose N . However in the information set f(1; 0); (1; 1)g his action will depend
on his beliefs. If he puts a lot of weight on player 2 being of type k = 1 (who plays
N in the information set f(0; 0); (1; 0)g and A in the information set f(1; 1); (2; 1)g),
he will choose the safe action N because the choice of A would involve a negative
expected payoff. However, if he puts enough weight on player 2 being of type
k = 0 (who plays A in both information sets that player 1 considers plausible),
the expected payoff of playing A will become positive and player 1 will choose A
himself; see Table 5.
player 1, k = 2 N A or N A ...
player 1, k = 1 N A A ...
player 1, k = 0 A A A ...
(0; 0) (1; 0) (1; 1) (2; 1) (2; 2) ...
player 2, k = 0 A A ...
player 2, k = 1 N A ...
Table 5: Level 0, 1, and 2 actions in the email game.
Players of higher types also face the situation of being “on the fence”: for exam-
ple, if player 1 of type k = 2 chose N , then the behavior of player 2 of type k = 3 in
the information set f(1; 1); (2; 1)gwill depend on his subjective probability of types
k = 2 versus k = 0; 1 of player 1. For this reason, the further analysis of the game
depends on the cognitive type space.
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4.1 Lower Bound on Cooperation
The ﬁrst step in the analysis considers a type space where player i who is “on the
fence” always puts a high enough probability on player j being of a high cognitive
type who plays N in one of the information sets considered by i. An extreme case
of such a type space is the Immediate-predecessor type space of Example 2, where
player iwho is “on the fence” always puts probability 1 on j playingN in one of the
information sets considered by i. Note, that this type space yields a lower bound
on the occurrences of cooperation because player i of level k who is “on the fence”
in a given information set always plays A in information sets to the right of that
information set.
Theorem 2. For any cognitive type space and any cognitive equilibrium of the email game
where players of level k = 0 always choose A, player 1 of cognitive type k chooses A upon
receiving more than k
2
messages and player 2 of cognitive type k chooses A upon receiving
more than k 1
2
messages.
Observe, that this lower bound on cooperation implies that upon receiving a
large number of messages only the players of high cognitive types will choose the
non-cooperative action N . This means that under a ﬁxed probability distribution
on types (which could, for example, describe the distribution of types from the
point of view of the analyst) the probability of N being chosen converges to zero as
the number of messages increases.
Corollary 1. For any cognitive type space and any probability distribution on it, for any
cognitive equilibrium of the email game where players of level k = 0 always choose A the
probability that A is chosen upon receiving n messages converges to 1 as n!1.
Note, however, that although players choose A after receiving many messages,
the number of required messages depends on the cognitive type of the player. Un-
der the Immediate-predecessor type space the number of messages required for a
player of level k to start playing A increases to inﬁnity with k. Observe, that in the
limit as k !1, N is always chosen regardless of the number of messages, which is
exactly the behavior coming from the iterative elimination of dominated strategies
described in Theorem 1. In particular, there is no equilibrium in which a number
of messages exists which makes all cognitive types play A.
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4.2 Upper Bound on Cooperation
The second step of the analysis studies cognitive type spaces where players’ be-
liefs about of the boundendess of their opponents slow down the iterative elimina-
tion process and create a uniform bound on the number of messages required for a
player of any cognitive type to play A. In these cases there is at least one situation
of player i of level k being “on the fence” and putting high enough a probability on
player j being of level l < k   1, so that he chooses A instead of N .
For example, in the ﬁrst situation of being “on the fence” described above, if the
subjective probability that k = 2 puts on k = 0 is high enough to convince him to
play A, the unravelling will stop at n = 1 and all players with higher levels will
play A after receiving one or more messages. For other type spaces the reason-
ing will have to continue; however, if in the limit the players “being on the fence”
believe with sufﬁciently high probability that their opponent is below their imme-
diate predecessor, the reasoning will have to stop at some number of messages n.
The following theorem makes this idea formal.
Theorem 3. For any cognitive type space satisfying Property 3 with a constant  = 2 "
3
there exists a cognitive equilibrium of the email game and a number of messages n such that
all cognitive types of both players choose to Attack if they receive n or more messages.
Theorem 3 is not a simple consequence of the fact that players are bounded, but
rather is an outcome of the strategic interaction between the players and in partic-
ular their beliefs about the boundedness of their opponents. The intuition for the
result is that if a high level type believes mostly in lower levels who themselves
believe in even lower levels, and so on, then the behavior of all types is largely de-
termined by the actions of the least cognitively able type, making the coordination
possible.
The content of Theorem 3 can be also expressed in the language of cognitive
rationalizability. In that language, there exists n such that if players receive at least
n messages (there is mutual knowledge of the state of order at least n), cognitive
rationalizability predicts the same behavior as in the complete information game
(common knowledge of the state). Therefore “almost common knowledge” and
“common knowledge” result in the same predictions.
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4.3 Robustness of the Results
4.3.1 Actions of level k = 0
Note that there exists the “bad” equilibrium where players of level k = 0 choose N
independently of their information set and consequently all types of both play-
ers choose not to attack.18 However, the “good” equilibrium does not rely on the
level 0 agent attacking in all information sets. An alternative speciﬁcation of the
level 0 strategies involves playingN for the ﬁrstmmessages andA thereafter. Such
a modeling choice results in the same conclusion as Theorems 2–3, no matter how
highm is, and has the feature that all players, even the level k = 0 player, are behav-
ing rationally, and in fact, for high values of m the players have “almost common
knowledge of rationality”. A third alternative for specifying the level 0 action is a
mixed strategy choosing A with probability  and N with probability 1   . The
payoffs of the game are chosen so that whenever an agent faces  = 0:5, it is opti-
mal for him to choose N , which is the reason why Theorem 1 holds for any " > 0.
However, any  > 2
3
guarantees that Theorems 2–3 hold.19
4.3.2 Boundedness of types
It is important to observe that Theorem 3 does not rely on everyone in the pop-
ulation being boundedly rational. In particular it could be assumed that there is
a proportion  of sophisticated players who are unboundedly rational and have a
correct perception of . Formally, let  2 (N) and let 1 denote the sophisticated
type.20 His belief ;i onN[f1g is deﬁned by ;i (1) =  and ;i (k) = (1 )(k).
Let C^;i = Ci [ (f1g  f;i g) and C^; = C^;1  C^;2 .
18The existence of this equilibrium is not troubling, as (N;N) is an equilibrium of the complete
information game. It is rather the inexistence of the cooperative equilibrium in the standard setting
(Theorem 1) that was the focus of Rubinstein’s (1989) paper.
19Additionally, it can be shown that for any " the payoff matrix of the game can be modiﬁed
(by setting  L for every occurrence of  2 in Table 2 and M for every occurrence of 1) so that the
results of Theorems 2–3 obtain, while the only rationalizable outcome still involves not attacking
(i.e., Theorem 1 still holds) as long as (1  ")M < L < M .
20Sophisticated types are similar to “worldly” types of Stahl and Wilson (1995), who with prob-
ability  believe in the “naive Nash types”. It follows from the proof of Theorem 4 that the same
conclusion holds for “worldly” types.
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Theorem 4. For any cognitive type space C satisfying Property 3 with  = 2 "
3
, for any
 2 (N), and for any  < 1
3
there exists a cognitive equilibrium on C^; with a number of
messages n such that all cognitive types, including the sophisticated type, of both players
choose to Attack if the number of their messages is bigger or equal than n.
This theorem shows that the results of Theorem 3, i.e., the insensitivity to higher
order beliefs, are not a simple consequence of the boundedness of the players, but
rather of the assumption about the perception of the boundedness of the oppo-
nents. It is the strategic interaction of players under this assumption that delivers
the result. Adding the unbounded players to the picture does not reverse the re-
sult because of the beliefs those unbounded players are endowed with: they put a
sufﬁciently high weight (1    > 2
3
) on the bounded players. This insight is more
general that the context of this theorem. The key role is played by the beliefs, rather
than just the boundedness, because increasing the bound of a given agent without
altering his beliefs leads to the same behavior, while keeping his bound constant
but altering beliefs may lead to a change in behavior.
5 Discussion and relation to literature
5.1 Experimental work
There is an intriguing relationship between the results of this paper and the exper-
imental ﬁndings reported in (Camerer, 2003, pp. 226–232). Experimental subjects
were playing a version of the email game several times (with random repairings
to avoid repeated games considerations) with strategies truncated at some number
of messages.21 In all repetitions of the game the fraction of subjects choosing to
attack was increasing in the number of messages. In the early repetitions very few
subjects chose N and the fraction of subjects choosing N after seeing six or more
messages was zero. This is precisely the picture one would expect from Theorem 3.
Interestingly, after several repetitions of the game, the threshold number of mes-
sages after which the subjects switch to playing A started increasing, eventually
21The ﬁxed upper bound on the number of messages makes this game formally different, espe-
cially in the light of the results of Binmore and Samuelson (2001).
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surpassing the upper bound imposed on the number of messages in the experimen-
tal design. This suggests that the depth of reasoning considerations are especially
important in “new” games, whereas in more frequent interactions a larger role may
be played by the standard models of game theory and therefore the importance of
higher order beliefs considerations may be higher.
One of the possible explanations for this increase in the threshold is that players
updated their beliefs about the distribution of cognitive types in the player popu-
lation (the matching was random and therefore precluded learning about any ﬁxed
player). Alternatively, the increased exposure to the game itself may have given
the players more time to analyze the game and their own cognitive types increased.
5.2 Topologies on Higher Order Beliefs
As mentioned in the introduction, an important branch of game theory has devel-
oped in reaction to Rubinstein’s observation, with the goal of identifying the notion
of distance on higher order beliefs that would restore the continuity of the standard
solution concepts. Under the natural notion of distance (product topology) the sit-
uation of “almost common knowledge of the game” (having received many mes-
sages) is close to the “common knowledge of the game,” however the equilibrium
behavior differs between the two situations. Monderer and Samet (1989) and most
recently Dekel et al. (2006) and Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2009a,b) pin
down a stronger topology on beliefs that makes behavior continuous in all games.
Under this notion “almost common knowledge” is by deﬁnition far from “common
knowledge,” precisely because behavior differs between the two situations.
In contrast, the exercise in this paper is to ﬁx the natural notion of distance
(product topology) and ﬁnd a solution concept (cognitive equilibrium or cogni-
tive rationalizability) that is continuous in that topology. Under this interpretation,
“almost common knowledge” is close to “common knowledge” and the behavior
predicted in those two situations is close (in fact identical).
This interpretation of the ﬁndings is consistent with the recent contribution of
Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), who show that no reﬁnement of rationalizability that
allows for two equilibria in the full information game can be continuous in the
product topology. In order to obtain continuity, the solution concept has to be
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changed to one that allows for strategies that are not rationalizable. Cognitive ra-
tionalizability has precisely this desired property: under the nondiverging beliefs
assumption the solution concept is larger than rationalizability.
5.3 Mechanism Design
This section discusses the contrast between two notions of robustness in mecha-
nism design. A recent literature (e.g., Bergemann and Morris, 2005), motivated by
the Wilson (1987) doctrine of successive elimination of the common knowledge as-
sumptions, remains ignorant about the higher order beliefs of the agents and is
looking for mechanisms that do well under many different speciﬁcations of be-
liefs. Because in standard solution concepts behavior is discontinuous in beliefs,
the designer has to be very conservative in his choice of the mechanism in order
to ensure the desired outcome, especially if, following Weinstein and Yildiz (2007),
he thinks that the product topology “captures a reasonable restriction on the re-
searcher’s ability to observe players’ beliefs.”
On the other hand, recent papers by Crawford and Iriberri (2007b) and Craw-
ford et al. (2009) study design with agents who have a bounded depth of reason-
ing. With the “immediate-predecessor cognitive type space,” Crawford and Iriberri
(2007b) show that bounded depth of reasoning may lead to overbidding in auc-
tions, which allows for an explanation of the winner’s curse. Crawford et al. (2009)
is a careful study of the optimal mechanism design problem taking into account
the fact that players’ cognitive abilities may be bounded. One of the key insightful
observations is that in the setting of mechanism design, what is being designed is
possibly a brand new game, which is likely to be played for the very ﬁrst time. This
makes the level-k models a relevant tool of analysis, but potentially introduces a
concern about the robustness of the mechanism to the actions of lower types.
Because, as the results of this paper suggest, level-k behavior is not sensitive to
the common knowledge assumptions, the ﬁrst concern for robustness is attenuated.
Those models are therefore a sensible alternate way of implementing the Wilson
doctrine. However, they introduce another concern: instead of worrying about
higher order beliefs, the designer has to worry about the lower order cognitive
22
types. The notion of the cognitive type space that this paper introduces makes it
possible to explore this tradeoff between the two notions of robustness by varying
the assumption about the beliefs about the players’ depth of reasoning.
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A Appendix: Universal Cognitive Type Space
This appendix deﬁnes the collection of all possible cognitive hierarchies, i.e., beliefs
about the opponent’s depth of reasoning and collects them in the universal cognitive
type space.
A cognitive hierarchy of player i is a belief about the cognitive ability of  i,
together with i’s belief about i’s belief about the cognitive ability of i, etc. The set
Zki denotes all possible cognitive hierarchies of a player with level k of cognitive
ability and is deﬁned recursively as follows.
Z0i := f0g
Z1i := f1g 
 
Z0 i

Z2i := f2g 
 
Z0 i [ Z1 i

...
Zki := fkg 
 
k 1[
l=0
Z l i
!
The set Z0i is trivially a singleton, as the level 0 type does not act on any beliefs.
Similarly, the set Z1i is a singleton because the level 1 type believes in only one type
of opponent: namely level 0. Beliefs of higher levels can be more complicated. For
instance various types of level 2 of player i are distinguished by their beliefs in the
proportion of levels 0 and 1 of players  i. Various types of level 3 of player i are
distinguished by their beliefs in the proportion of levels 0, 1, and 2 of players  i
and their beliefs about the mix of various types of level 2 of players  i (i.e. what
mix of levels 0 and 1 of player i do the players  i of level 2 believe in).
The set S1k=0 Zki collects all possible cognitive hierarchies. Note that all hier-
archies of beliefs are ﬁnite because of the assumption that all players have ﬁnite
bounds and believe that their opponents have bounds strictly lower than them-
selves. We now show that the set S1k=0 Zki with the natural belief mapping consti-
tutes a type space. To be precise, for it to be a type space in the sense of Deﬁnition 1,
the cognitive bound and belief mappings need to be measurable. Endow each set
Zk i with the product -algebra and each set
Sk 1
l=0 Z
l
 i and
S1
l=0 Z
l
i with the direct
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sum -algebra (see Fremlin, 2001, Section 214).
Deﬁnition 2 (Universal Cognitive Type Space). Ci :=
S1
k=0 Z
k
i ; for any ci = (ki; i) 2
Ci let ki (ci ) := ki and for any measurableF i  C i, i (ci )(F i) := i

F i \
Ski 1
n=0 Z
n
 i

.
The following lemma ensures the correctness of this deﬁnition.
Lemma 1.
(i) For any measurable set F i  C i and any k 2 N the set F i \
Sk 1
n=0 Z
n
 i is measur-
able in Sk 1n=0 Zn i.
(ii) The mapping ki : Ci ! N is measurable.
(iii) The mapping i : Ci ! (C i) is measurable.
Proof. Proof of (i): follows from the deﬁnition of the direct sum -algebra on setsS1
l=0 Z
l
 i and
Sk 1
l=0 Z
l
i .
Proof of (ii): It sufﬁces to observe that for each n 2 N the set (ki ) 1(n) = fci 2
Ci jki(ci ) = ng = Zni is measurable in Ci by deﬁnition of the the direct sum -
algebra.
Proof of (iii): By deﬁnition it sufﬁces to show that for any measurable set E 
(C i) the set (i ) 1(E) is measurable in Ci . It sufﬁces to check this deﬁnition
only for the generators of the -algebra on (C i), i.e., sets of the form E = f 2
(C i)j(F i)  pg for some p 2 [0; 1] and some measurable set F i  C i. Thus,
by the deﬁnition of the mapping i , it sufﬁces to show that the set f(ki; i) 2
Ci ji(F i \
Ski 1
n=0 Z
n
 i)  pg is measurable in Ci . By deﬁnition of the the direct
sum -algebra this set is measurable in Ci if and only if for each k 2 N the set
fi 2 (
Sk 1
n=0 Z
n
 i)ji(F i \
Sk 1
n=0 Z
n
 i)  pg is measurable in (
Sk 1
n=0 Z
n
 i), but this
is true because of (i) and how the -algebra on (Sk 1n=0 Zn i) is generated.
The space C is universal in the sense that any hierarchy of beliefs that arises
in some type space belongs to C. The following Deﬁnition and Theorem formalize
this notion.
Deﬁnition 3. A collection of measurable mappings hi : Ci ! Ci for i = 1; : : : ; I , is
belief preserving if i (hi(ci))(E) = i(ci)(h 1 i (E)) for any measurable E  C i.
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Theorem 5. For any cognitive type space C there exists a collection of belief preserving
mappings hi : Ci ! Ci for i = 1; : : : ; I .
The proof is standard (Mertens and Zamir, 1985; Brandenburger and Dekel,
1993; Heifetz and Samet, 1998), except that the type space is a union of measur-
able spaces rather than a single measurable space.
Proof. For any cognitive type spaceC construct the mappings hi by a recursion on k
hi(ci) :=
8>>><>>>:
0 if ki(ci) = 0;
(1; 0) if ki(ci) = 1; 
ki(ci); i(ci)  h 1 i
 if ki(ci)  2:
Note that this construction is correct since by deﬁnition if (k; i ) 2 Zki , then the do-
main of i is the collection of measurable subsets of
Sk 1
l=0 Z
l
 i and the value of h i
on those elements of C i which have k i  k   1 is already deﬁned. Hence, h 1 i is
well deﬁned on Sk 1l=0 Z l i. The fact that h 1 i (G) is a measurable set for any measur-
able set G 2 C i follows from the measurability of the mappings hi to be shown
now.
To show that the mappings hi are measurable note that for any measurable set
G  Ci we have G =
S1
k=0(G\Zki ), so h 1i (G) = [1k=0h 1i (G\Zki ); hence, it sufﬁces
to show that for any measurable Gki  Zki the set h 1i (Gki ) is measurable. To show
this, proceed by induction. For k = 0; 1 the result is immediate and follows from the
measurability of the mapping ki. Assume now the result holds for k0 = 0; 1; : : : ; k.
Note that any measurable Gk+1i  Zk+1i is of the form fk+1gF for some mea-
surable F  
Sk
l=0 Z
l
 i

and by deﬁnition the collection of measurable subsets
of 
Sk
l=0 Z
l
 i

is generated by the family of sets
n
 2 
Sk
l=0 Z
l
 i

j (E)  p
o
for all measurable E  Skl=0 Z l i and p 2 [0; 1]. Thus, it sufﬁces to show that the set
fci 2 Ci j ki(ci) = k + 1g \ fci 2 Ci j i(ci)
 
h 1 i (E)
  pg is measurable for each
measurable E  Skl=0 Z l i and p 2 [0; 1]. The measurability of the ﬁrst component
of the intersection follows from the fact that the mapping ki is measurable for all i.
From the inductive hypothesis it follows that the set H := h 1 i (E) is a measurable
subset of C i. Since the mapping i is measurable for all i, it follows that the set
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fci 2 Ci j i(ci) 2 Ag is measurable for any measurable set A  (C i), in particu-
lar this is true for the set A := f 2 (C i) j (H)  pg, which is measurable since
the set H is measurable and by the deﬁnition of the -algebra on (C i).
To show that the mappings hi are belief preserving note that for any measurable
E  C i by Deﬁnition 1 and the construction of the mappings hi:
i (hi(ci))(E) = i(ci)  h 1 i
0@E \ ki(ci) 1[
n=0
Zn i
1A
= i(ci)
24h 1 i
0@E \ ki(ci) 1[
n=0
Zn i
1A35
= i(ci)
24h 1 i (E) \ h 1 i
0@ki(ci) 1[
n=0
Zn i
1A35
= i(ci)
24h 1 i (E) \ ki(ci) 1[
n=0
h 1 i (Z
n
 i)
35
= i(ci)

h 1 i (E) \ fc i 2 C i j k i(c i) < ki(ci)g

= i(ci)

h 1 i (E)

;
where the last equality follows from Equation (1) in Deﬁnition 1.
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B Appendix: Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2
We will inductively prove the following four assertions. For any cognitive type
space and any cognitive equilibrium of the email game where players of level k = 0
choose A
(i-k) Player 1 of level 2k chooses A upon receiving at least k messages,
(ii-k) Player 1 of level 2k + 1 chooses A upon receiving at least k messages,
(iii-k) Player 2 of level 2k chooses A upon receiving at least k   1 messages,
(iv-k) Player 2 of level 2k + 1 chooses A upon receiving at least k messages.
Observe that if these assertions hold for any k, then the proof of 2 is complete.
Also, observe that for both players the number of messages required to ensure his
playing A is monotonically increasing in the his level.
First, note that assertions (i-0), (ii-0), (iii-0), and (iv-0) follow from the construc-
tion in Section 4. Second, suppose that for some k assertions (i-l), (ii-l), (iii-l), and
(iv-l) hold for l = 0; 1; : : : ; k and prove that they hold for l = k + 1.
To prove assertion (i-k + 1) suppose that player 1 of level 2(k + 1) receives n
messages. This means that he thinks player 2 is of type 0; 1; : : : ; 2k; 2k + 1 and
received either m = n  1 or m = n messages. By the inductive hypothesis, player
2 chooses A if m > k. Thus, if n   1 > k, or n > k + 1, then player 1 is sure that
player 2 chooses A and chooses A himself.
The proofs of assertions (ii-k + 1), (iii-k + 1), and (iv-k + 1) are analogous.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Fix a cognitive type C space and a probability distribution  2 (C). Let i(k) be
the induced probability that player i has level k. By Theorem 2, in any cognitive
equilibrium of the email game where players of level k = 0 choose A, upon receiv-
ing n messages player 1 chooses A if he is of level k < 2n and player 2 chooses A if
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he is of level at least 2n + 1. This means, that the probability that player 1 chooses
A upon receiving n messages is at leastP2n 1k=0 1(k) and the probability that player
1 chooses A upon receiving n messages is at least P2nk=0 2(k). Since P1k=0 1(k) =P1
k=0 2(k) = 1, it follows that limn!1
P2n 1
k=0 1(k) =
P2n
k=0 2(k) = 1.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Let cii : N! fA;Ng be the cognitive equilibrium strategies constructed iteratively
in Section 4 starting from 0i (n) = A for all n.
Lemma 2. For every i, for everyn, and for every ci 2 Ci if cii (n+1) = N then cii (n) = N:
Proof. Prove the contrapositive
8i8n8ci2Ci [cii (n) = A]) [cii (n+ 1) = A]
by induction on ki(ci). First observe that for all i and for all n it trivially follows
that [cii (n) = A]) [cii (n+ 1) = A] for all ci 2 Ci with ki(ci) = 0.
Second, suppose that
8i8n8 ci2Ci
ki(ci)K
[cii (n) = A]) [cii (n+ 1) = A] (2)
and show that
8i8n [cii (n) = A]) [cii (n+ 1) = A]: (3)
for all ci 2 Ci with ki(ci) = K +1. Fix a probability measure  2 (C i) and deﬁne
xi (n) := ( 2)   (fci 2 Ci j cii (n) = Ng) + 1   (fci 2 Ci j cii (n) = Ag) :
Observe that by (2)
8n xi (n)  xi (n+ 1): (4)
First consider agent 1. Let  be the belief of the cognitive type c1 of agent 1 who got
n messages and has k1(c1) = K + 1. If c11 (n) = A, then the payoff from choosing A
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is greater than choosing N .
1
2  "x

2(n  1) +
1  "
2  "x

2(n)  0:
By the independence assumption,  is also the belief of the cognitive type c1 of
agent 1 who got n+ 1 messages; thus by (4)
1
2  "x

2(n) +
1  "
2  "x

2(n+ 1)  0:
Hence, c11 (n+1) = A. Second, consider agent 2. Let  be the belief of the cognitive
type c2 of agent 2 who got n messages and has k2(c2) = K + 1. If c22 (n) = A, then
the payoff from choosing A is greater than choosing N .
1
2  "x

1(n) +
1  "
2  "x

1(n+ 1)  0:
By the independence assumption,  is also the belief of the cognitive type c2 of
agent 2 who got n+ 1 messages; thus by (4)
1
2  "x

1(n+ 1) +
1  "
2  "x

1(n+ 2)  0:
Hence, c22 (n+ 1) = A. This proves (3) and concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3 Observe that by construction of the equilibrium for every k
only ﬁnitely many actions can be N ; thus,
8i8ci9n8mn cii (m) = A: (5)
The goal is to show that
9n8i8ci8mn cii (m) = A: (6)
Suppose (6) is false. Then
8n9i9ci9mn cii (m) = N:
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It follows from Lemma 2 that
8n9i9ci cii (n) = N: (7)
Claim:
8i8n9ci cii (n) = N: (8)
Suppose not. There are two possible cases:
9n
h
9c2 [c22 (n) = N ] and 8c1 [c11 (n) = A]
i
: (i)
and
9n
h
9c1 [c11 (n) = N ] and 8c2 [c22 (n) = A]
i
: (ii)
But (i) cannot be true because by Lemma 2 c11 (n + 1) = A for all c1, which means
that the cognitive type c2 of player 2 is sure that player 1 chooses A, and should
therefore choose A himself, i.e., c22 (n) = A. Contradiction. Similarly, (ii) cannot be
true. By Lemma 2 c22 (n + 1) = A for all c2. From (7) it follows that there exists i
and ci with cii (n + 1) = N . The two last sentences imply that there exists c1 with
c11 (n + 1) = N . However, the cognitive type c1 of player 1 is sure that player 2
chooses A, and should therefore choose A himself, i.e., c11 (n) = A. Contradiction.
This proves the claim, so (8) holds.
For any n deﬁne ki(n) to be the smallest ki(ci) such that cii (n) = N .
Observe that
8n k2(n  1) < k1(n) < k2(n): (9)
To verify the ﬁrst inequality, suppose take any cognitive type c1 of player 1 that
has k1(c1) = k2(n   1). Then by Lemma 2 k1(c1)  k2(n) and player 1 of cognitive
type c1 who got n messages is sure that player 2 chooses A; hence c11 (n) = A and
k1(n) > k1(c1) = k2(n   1). To verify the second inequality, apply an analogous
argument for player 2 of cognitive type c2 with k2(c2) = k2(n).
To conclude the proof, consider player 2 of cognitive type c2 with k2(c2) = k2(n)
who received n messages. Under the independence assumption, player 1 plays N
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with probability
1
2  "2(c2)
 fc1 2 C1 j k1(c1)  k1(n)g+1  "
2  "2(c2) (fc1 2 C1 j k1(c1)  k1(n+ 1)g) :
It follows from (9) that this probability is smaller than
1
2  "2(c2)
 fc1 2 C1 j k1(c1)  k2(n 1)g+1  "
2  "2(c2) (fc1 2 C1 j k1(c1)  k2(n)g) :
By assumption the second part is equal to zero, while by Property 3 with  = 2 "
3
inf
n
sup
c22fc22C2jk2(c2)=k2(n)g
1
2  "2(c2) (fc1 2 C1 j k1(c1)  k2(n  1)g) <
1
3
Thus, there exists n such that the payoff from playing A for any cognitive type c2 of
player 2 with k2(c2) = k2(n) who received n messages is larger than zero; hence, he
should play A, rather than N implied by the deﬁnition of k2(n). Contradiction.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 4
It follows from Theorem 3 that on C there exists an cognitive equilibrium with a
number of messages n such that all cognitive types choose to attack having received
n or more messages. The behavior of those types will be the same on C;, so only
the behavior of type 1 should be considered. Suppose that type 1 of player i
received n + 1 or more messages. Playing N guarantees him a payoff of 0. The
payoff of playingAwill depend on what type1 of i is doing. The lowers possible
payoff from choosing A is when that type is playing N and is equal to   ( 2) +
(1   )  1  0; thus, no matter what type 1 of player  i, type 1 of player i has a
strict incentive to play A as long as he receives n+ 1 or more messages.
32
References
Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2005): “Robust Mechanism Design,” Econometrica,
1771–1813.
Binmore, K. and L. Samuelson (2001): “Coordinated action in the electronic mail
game,” Games and Economic Behavior, 35, 6–30.
Brandenburger, A. and E. Dekel (1993): “Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowl-
edge,” Journal of Economic Theory, 59, 10.
Cabrales, A., R. Nagel, and R. Armenter (2007): “Equilibrium selection through
incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study,” Experi-
mental Economics, 10, 221–234.
Camerer, C. F. (2003): Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction.
Camerer, C. F., T.-H. Ho, and J.-K. Chong (2004): “A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of
Games,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 861–898.
Carlsson, H. and E. van Damme (1993): “Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,”
Econometrica, 61, 989–1018.
Chen, Y.-C., A. Di Tillio, E. Faingold, and S. Xiong (2009a): “Common Belief, Ratio-
nalizability and Proximity of Types„” mimeo.
——— (2009b): “Uniform Topologies on Types,” mimeo.
Costa-Gomes, M., V. P. Crawford, and B. Broseta (2001): “Cognition and Behavior
in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study,” Econometrica, 69, 1193–1235.
Costa-Gomes, M. A. and V. P. Crawford (2006): “Cognition and Behavior in Two-
Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review,
96, 1737–1768.
Crawford, V., U. Gneezy, and Y. Rottenstreich (2008): “The Power of Focal Points
is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Fail-
ures,” American Economic Review, 98, 1443–1458.
Crawford, V. and N. Iriberri (2007a): “Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naivete, and So-
phistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games,” American Economic Review,
97, 1731–1750.
33
Crawford, V. P. and N. Iriberri (2007b): “Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium
Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner’s Curse and Overbidding in
Private-Value Auctions?” Econometrica, 75, 1721–1770.
Crawford, V. P., T. Kugler, Z. Neeman, and A. Pauzner (2009): “Behaviorally Op-
timal Auction Design: An Example and Some Observations,” Journal of the Euro-
pean Economic Association, 7.
Dekel, E., D. Fudenberg, and S. Morris (2006): “Topologies on Types,” Theoretical
Economics, 1.
Frankel, D. M., S. Morris, and A. Pauzner (2003): “Equilibrium selection in global
games with strategic complementarities,” Journal of Economic Theory, 108, 1–44.
Fremlin, D. H. (2001): Measure Theory, Vol. 2: Broad Foundations.
Georganas, S., P. J. Healy, and R. A. Weber (2010): “On the persistence of strategic
sophistication,” Ohio State University Working Paper.
Halpern, J. (1986): “Reasoning about knowledge: An overview,” Theoretical aspects
of reasoning about knowledge.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1967): “Games with Incomplete Information Played by ”Bayesian”
Players, I-III. Part I. The Basic Model,” Management Science, 14, 159–182.
Healy, P. J., S. Georganas, and R. Weber (2010): “On the Persistence of Strategic
Sophistication,” mimeo.
Heifets, A. and W. Kets (2013): “Robust Multiplicity with a Grain of Naivete,” Tech.
rep.
Heifetz, A. and D. Samet (1998): “Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 82, 324–341.
Heinemann, F., R. Nagel, and P. Ockenfels (2004): “The theory of global games
on test: experimental analysis of coordination games with public and private
information,” Econometrica, 72, 1583–1599.
Ho, T.-H., C. Camerer, and K. Weigelt (1998): “Iterated Dominance and Iterated
Best Response in Experimental ”p-Beauty Contests”,” American Economic Review,
88, 947–969.
Ivanov, A., D. Levin, and M. Niederle (2010): “Can relaxation of beliefs rationalize
the winner’s curse?: an experimental study,” Econometrica, 78, 1435–1452.
34
Kets, W. (2014): “Finite Depth of Reasoning and Equilibrium Play in Games with
Incomplete Information,” Tech. rep.
Kneeland, T. (2012): “Coordination under limited depth of reasoning,” University
of British Columbia Working Paper.
Mertens, J. F. and S. Zamir (1985): “Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games
with incomplete information,” International Journal of Game Theory, 14, 1–29.
Monderer, D. and D. Samet (1989): “Approximating Common Knowledge with
Common Beliefs,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 170–190.
Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (1998): “A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks,”
CEPR Discussion Papers 2025, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Myerson, R. B. (1991): Game theory, Harvard university press.
Nagel, R. (1995): “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” The
American Economic Review, 85, 1313–1326.
Rogers, B. W., T. R. Palfrey, and C. F. Camerer (2009): “Heterogeneous quantal re-
sponse equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies,” Journal of Economic Theory, 144,
1440–1467.
Rubinstein, A. (1989): “The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under ”Al-
most Common Knowledge”,” The American Economic Review, 79, 385–391.
Stahl, D. (1993): “Evolution of smartn players,” Games and Economic Behavior, 5,
604–617.
Stahl, D. O. and P. W. Wilson (1994): “Experimental evidence on players’ models
of other players,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25, 309–327.
——— (1995): “On Players’ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental
Evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 218–254.
Weinstein, J. and M. Yildiz (2007): “A structure theorem for rationalizability with
application to robust predictions of reﬁnements,” Econometrica, 75, 365–400.
Wilson, R. (1987): “Game theoretic analyses of trading processes,” in Advances in
Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA,
33–70.
35
